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A s the initial speaker on the first panel of the Newport conference dealing with non-international armed con flict (NIAC) in the twenty-first century, I 
was asked to do two things. First, establish the framework for a broad and compre-
hensivediscussion ofNIAC by assessing, historically. the wayin which the interna-
tional community has attempted to define this particular form of conflict, to 
include the issue of whether there now exist various types ofNIAC. Second, speak 
to the U.S. practice with respect to the manner in which the United States has de-
termined whether to designate certain hostilities as NlACs. 
In undertaking that mandate, I was reminded of the words of Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht: "[ I Jf international law is. in some ways, at the vanishing point oflaw, 
the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of inter-
national law. "I And, given the nuances of our current subject matter, I would think 
it appropriate to add to this statement "If the law of war is at the vanishing point of 
international law, then, surely, the law related to non-international armed conflict 
is at the vanishing point of the law of war." 
.. Colonel, u.s. Army (Ret.); Executive Director, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and 
School, U.S. Anny. The author has prepared this article in his personal capacity and does not 
purport to represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army or 
The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School. 
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My addition to the Lauterpacht quote results from the fact that the matter of 
what activities do-and do not---constitute a NIAC is an exceptionally conten-
tious one. The criteria to be used in making such a determination enjoy no univer-
sal acceptance. Time and again these are said to be "evolving." Increasingly, we are 
advised that today's NIAC is no longer the NIACof old. And, by "old," commenta-
tors speak in terms of a scant ten years ago. Now, the "traditional" NlAC is said to 
have been joined by what are referred to as asymmetric "transnational" armed con-
flicts. 2 So, having set forth these uncertainties surrounding the nature of NJACs, 
how are we to recognize such a conflict when we see one? 
In parsing this puzzle, it is best to cast a large net, beginning with an assessment 
of the concept of "armed conflict" itself. Having done this, we can then move on to 
examine the direction in which the international community has moved in its at-
tempt to more closely demarcate the boundaries of what is-and is not-armed 
conflict of a non-international character. 
Let us begin with the fact that, as surprising as it might appear, the law of war, or 
the law of armed conflict as it is also known, provides no definitive definition of 
"armed conflict,» even though this term is specifically referenced in both Common 
Article 2 and Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, articles that 
deal with international and non-international armed conflict, respectively.3 And 
there exists no agreed test for assessing when certain actions have risen to the level 
of an "armed conflict.» 
Having said this, however, it is also true that the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (JCRe) Commentary on these articles (Pictet's Commentary) has histor-
ically been looked to as the principal source of their interpretation;' This Commen-
tary references identifiable factors to be considered when making a determination 
as to whether either an international or non-international armed conflict exists. 
The matter of determining the existence of a Common Article 2 international 
armed conflict is, in fact, a rather straightforward one. The text of Article 2 speaks 
in terms of "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized byone of them." The key here is that the use of force by opposing regu-
lar armed forces of two or more States evidences an international armed conflict. 
The Commentary notes in this regard that the reality of the existence of such a con-
flict is simply not affected by the scope, duration or intensity of the hostilities in-
volved. Instead, the use of the term "armed conflict" in this context was intended to 
apply to de facto hostilities, no matter their duration or how non-destructive they 
actually might have been.s 
Now, having noted that determining the existence of an international armed 
conflict is not that complex, I would certainly caveat this statement with the 
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observation that this determinative process may become much more problematic 
in those instances in which a non-international armed conflict might, at some 
point, become "internationalized." This occurs when one or more external States 
intervene in such hostilities. Given the focus of this article, however, the debate 
over the degree of "effective" or "overall" control that a State must exercise over in-
surgent elements in order for this "internationalization" process to occur will not 
be addressed.6 Suffice it to say that the determinative factors related to interna-
tional armed conflicts contained in Pictet's Commentary really do very little to as-
sist in making a judgment as to whether certain actions may---or may not-be 
designated NIACs. And the ability to make such a determination is, of course, our 
ultimate goal. 
Given this fact, the starting point in assessing the existence of a NIAC must nec-
essarily be Common Article 3: "In the case of anned conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each 
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provi-
sions . .. . " The difficulty, historically, in turning to Article 3 has been, of course, 
that neither the text nor the commentary to this article provides definitive guid-
ance regarding what is meant by the phrase "conflict not of an international char-
acter." Pictet, himself, has noted that the negotiators of the 1949 Conventions 
"deliberately refrained from defining the non-international armed conflicts which 
were the subject of Common Article 3."1 Thus, it has never been clear what level of 
violence must be reached-and how protracted the actions in issue must be-in 
order for such hostilities to be deemed a non-international armed conflict. Internal 
situations that have reached a very high level of violence have often been regarded, 
certainly by the States in which such violence has occurred, as mere banditry-acts 
which have not achieved the threshold of "armed conflict."8 
This uncertainty has persisted over the years, notwithstanding the fact that 
Pictet's Commentary offered what he referred to as some "convenient criteria" for 
determining the existence of a NlAC: 
(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized 
military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate terri-
tory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention. 
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military 
forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the na-
tional territory. 
(3) (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or 
(b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or 
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(e) that it has accorded the insurgents recogni tion as belligerents fo r the pur-
poses only of the present Convention; or 
(d ) that the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Councilor 
the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international 
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. 
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteris-
tics of a State. 
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over the popu-
lation within a determinate portion of the national terri tory. 
(e) That the armed fo rces act under the direction of an organized authority and 
are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war. 
Cd) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the 
Convention.9 
Despite these criteria, States have, nevertheless, consistently resisted recogni-
tion of the existence of an armed conflict within their borders for fear, understand-
ably, of affording some form of de facto status or legitimacy to those responsible for 
fos tering the violence in issue-that is, to those who are engaging in hostile acts in 
an effort to displace the de jure government. This lack of certainty and lack of con-
sensus regarding the scope of Article 3's applicability has, over the years, led to at-
tempts to better define Common Article 3 confli cts as a means of more effectively 
triggering the law applicable to them. 
Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
Each of the protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions attempted to bring more 
clarity to activities which were-and were not-to be deemed non-international 
armed confli cts. 1o The significance of Protocol I to this issue is, of course, its char-
acterization in Article 1 (4) of certain essentially non-international, internal con-
flicts as "international" in character-that is, "armed conflicts in which peoples are 
fighting against colonial domination [Portugal's colonies in sub-Saharan Africa] 
and alien occupation [Israel's occupation of territories captured in 1967] and 
against racist regimes [the then-existing regimes in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and 
South Africa] in the exercise of their right of self-determination." 
While the United States is not a party to Protocol I and is not bound by-and 
does not accept-Article 1 (4) as customaIY international law, for the purposes of 
this discussion it must be noted that the ICRC Commentary on Protocol I states 
that the situations specifically set forth in Article 1(4) constitute an "exhaustive 
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list" of those types of internal conflicts that may be viewed as "international" in 
character. ll Accordingly, it is apparent that the Protocol has no bearing on inter-
nal, non-international conflicts that do not fall within one of these three narrow 
categories. And, as a practical matter, when has there last been seen an internal 
conflict that would meet these criteria? In sum, Protocol I really does very little to 
better enable the international community to define and determine the existence 
ofa NIAC. 
Protocol II was, of course, the first attempt to regulate, by treaty, the methods 
and means of the employment of the use of force in internal armed conflicts. Its 
purpose was to confirm, clarify and expand upon the minimal protections con-
tained in Common Article 3. The inherent difficulty with Protocol II, given our 
stated purpose of discerning how to better define and determine the existence of a 
NIAC, is the fact that this Protocol establishes a much higher threshold of applica-
tion than does Common Article 3. While Common Article 3 is said to apply to all 
conflicts "not of an international character," Article 1 (1) of Protocol II states that it 
applies only to armed conflicts 
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces 
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
This decision by the drafters of Protocol II to define non-international armed 
conflict, thus triggering the application of the Protocol's provisions on the basis of 
objective criteria, has, in fact, had the result of substantially narrowing the number 
of NIACs to which the Protocol might apply. The criteria set forth obviously re-
strict the Protocol's applicability to those conflicts of a high degree of intensity-
essentially classic civil wars. The Protocol has seldom been deemed applicable to 
the great number of internal armed conflicts that have occurred since its inception, 
as insurgent groups have rarely, if ever, been able to meet the stringent require-
ments of Article 1(1 ). 
Moreover, while Article 1(2) goes on to state that the Protocol will not ap-
ply to "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated 
and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature, as not being 
armed conflicts," many cases of internal violence that do not meet the criteria of 
Article 1 ( I) are, nevertheless, far more intense in nature than are riots and spo-
radic violence. As a result, these types of scenarios might legitimately be viewed as 
non-international armed conflicts to which Common Article 3 should apply. The 
bottom line is that the criteria contained in Article 1(1 ) do not greatly assist, as 
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was their intent, in determining the existence of a NIAC. Indeed, it can be argued 
that the high bar of application established by this provision has served as a fur-
ther excuse for governments to deny the existence of non-international armed 
conflicts within their borders. 
In summary, then, asa result of Protocols I and II, the Geneva Conventions now 
recognize and regulate three distinct categories of non-international armed con-
fli ct: (1) the very specifically identified and limited internal "wars of nationalliber-
ation," as defined in Article 1(4) of Protocol I, to which all of the provisions of 
Protocol I apply; (2) classic "civil wars" as defined in Article 1 (1) of Protocol II; and 
(3) the ambiguously defined Common Article 3 "conflicts not of an international 
character." Thus, despite the stated intentions of the drafters of the Protocols, it 
might understandably be argued that we have returned to where we started-an 
inability to systematically identify, with very few exceptions, when violent activities 
occurring within States may legitimately be characterized as non-international 
armed conflicts. If this is the case, where do we next turn? 
The 1995 Tadic]urisdiction Decision 
In Octoberof1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICfY) issued what has become known as the Tadii jurisdiction decision, 12 a deci-
sion that many have since contended has considerably infl uenced the development 
of the law of armed conflict. This assertion is centered on the argument that the 
ICfY's statements on when, and in what manner, the basic principles ofthis body 
oflaw should be applied serve as authoritative detenninations on such matters. In-
deed, some have embraced the Tribunal's pronouncements as an almost instant 
form of customary law of armed conflict. And, while I am not among those who 
give such weight to this decision, given our stated purpose, it is useful to examine 
the definition of "armed conflict" set forth by the ICfY: "An anned conflict exists 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed vio-
lence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State."13 
The Tribunal thus defi ned non-international armed conflict as "protracted" 
armed violence that occurs between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or, significantly, between such armed groups themselves within a 
State. Important, as well, is the fact that the use of the term "protracted" in the Tri-
bunal's definition of non-international armed conflict can be viewed as meaning 
that hostilities need not be continuous. 
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In turn, in interpreting this definition of non-international armed conflict ar-
ticulated by the Tadic Appeals Chamber, the Tadic Trial Chamber opined the 
following: 
The test applied by the Appeals Chamber 10 the existence of an anned conflict for the 
purposes of the rules contained in Common Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a con-
flict; the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict In an 
armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these closely related criteria are used 
solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an anned conflict from ban-
ditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not 
subject to international humanitarian law. 14 
These two aspects of internal armed conflict set forth by the TadicTrial Cham-
ber-the "intensity" of the confli ct and the degree of "organization of the parties" 
involved in the conflict-it might be argued, can now serve as a basis for the rec-
ognition of "de facto" non-international armed conflicts, and thus for the appli-
cation of Common Article 3 to such conflicts. Support for this view can be found 
in the fact that, in determining the existence of non-international armed conflia 
within Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda employed pre-
cisely this approach, noting that in making such a determination, "it is necessary 
to evaluate both the ' intensity' and 'organization of the parties' to the conflict."I) 
Further endorsement of the reasoning contained in the IcrY's Tadic decision 
is reflected, as well, in the adaptation of the "Tadic formula" in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court. The second sentence of Article 8(2)(f) of the 
Statute states that the Statute applies "to armed conflicts that take place in the 
terri tory of a State when there is protracted armed confli ct between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups."16 Th is adap-
tation originated in a proposal submitted by Sierra Leone and was accepted in 
an apparent effort to provide a positive definition of non-international armed 
conflict. 17 
Given these developments, even absent a detailed examination of the exact 
meaning of the terms "intensity" of a conflict and "organization of the parties" to a 
conflict, it is apparent that a legitimate argument can now be made that the Tadii 
formula may well have had the effect oflowering the threshold required for the rec-
ognition of a non-international armed conflict. Very importantly, however, it re-
mains to be seen whether future State practice will, in fact, sanction the validity of 
this approach. 
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"Global" Non-International Anned Confl icts? 
At this juncture, it is essential to recognize that all of the preceding discussion re-
garding the nature and scope of non-international armed conflict has centered on 
violence-that is, hostilities-occurring within the boundaries of a State, thus, 
internal armed conflict. There is good reason for this. This is the geographical con-
text in which NIACs have historically-and legally-been defmed. Common Arti-
cle 3 conflicts "not of an international character" have, since the adoption of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, consistently and uniformly been viewed in this man-
ner. And no State, to include the United States, has ever challenged this 
interpretation. 
So, given this reality, what has recently driven an attempted move away from 
this historical interpretation of Common Article 3 and non-international armed 
conflict? The answer resides in the events of9/11 and the resultant attempts by the 
Bush administration to exercise the essentially unfettered "wartime" powers of a 
unitary executive. This resulted in an unprecedented misapplication of interna-
tional law, in general, and the law of armed conflict, in particular.18 And, when 
challenged by this overreach of executive authority, a compliant Congress failed to 
step forward to exercise its responsibility to rein in an administration running 
roughshod over the law, particularly that applicable to detainees held in the cus-
tody of the U.S. government. 
Recognizing this congressional failure, the U.S. Supreme Court had little 
choice but to act. And, while it can be argued that its intentions were good, the 
Court's legal reasoning was both faulty and self-serving. In June 2006, the Court 
issued its Hamdan decision. 19 Relevant to the topic at hand, the Court opined that 
Common Article 3 was, in fact, applicable to a "conflict not of an international 
character" then being waged between the United States and the terrorist organiza-
tion AI Qaeda. Its reasoning: the phrase "conilict not of an international charac-
ter" appears in Common Article 3 simply to evidence a contradistinction to a 
conflict between nations. "In context," the Court opined, this phrase must bear its 
literal meaning. And, while acknowledging that "the official commentaries 
[Pictet's Commetltary j accompanying Common Article 3 indicate that an 
important purpose of the provision was to furnish minimal protections to rebels 
involved in one kind of'conflict not of an international character,' i.e., a civil war," 
the Court then proceeded to note that "the commentaries also make clear 'that the 
scope of the Article must be as wide as possible.'''20 In referencing this statement, 
however, the Court intentionally chose to ignore the context in which this com-
ment was made. The Commentary text, following the listing of criteria set forth to 
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assist in determining the existence of what clearly can only be viewed as "internal" 
non-international armed conflicts, reads as follows: 
Does this mean that Article 3 is not applicable in cases where armed strife breaks out in a 
country, but does not fulfil any of the above conditions ... ? We do not subscribe to this 
view. We think, on the contrary, that the Article should be applied as widely as possible. 
There can be no reason against this. For, contrary to what may have been thought, the 
Article in its reduced form does not in any way limit the right of a State to put down 
rebellion. Nor does it increase in the slightest the authority of the rebel party.21 
An objective assessment of Pictet's commentary to Article 3 clearly evidences 
the fact that the Court either fa iled to appreciate or deliberately chose to ignore the 
historical and consistent interpretation of Common Article 3's application to--
exclusively-internal armed conflicts occurring within the territorial boundaries 
of one of the high contracting parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In my 
view, it was the latter. Unwilling to challenge the President's ill-conceived deter-
mination that the United States was engaged in a "global war against terrorism, "22 
the Court, in essence, said: "If you seek to invoke the law of armed conflict to in-
definitely incarcerate individuals seized in this 'war,' you must, at the very least, 
afford such individuals the minimal safeguards provided by this body of law-
those of Common Article 3." And, rather than framing such safeguards as custom-
ary law of armed conflict provisions (given both the administration's and the 
Court's disdain for the legitimacy of customary international law), the Court was 
determined to posture Article 3's requirements as a treaty obligation. Thus, the 
Court's dearly tortured interpretation of the phrase "conflict not of an interna-
tional character." 
And so was born the misguided notion of the potential existence of non-
international armed conflicts capable of spanning State boundaries. Indeed, the 
Hamdan decision has since been cited as definitive proof of this fact, given the 
Court's recognition of the existence of a "global" NlAC to which Common Article 
3 was said to applyP The reality is, of course, that the U.S. Supreme Court does 
not-and cannot-speak for the international community when it comes to the in-
terpretation of multilateral international agreements. Nevertheless, the Court's at-
tempt to significantly expand the defmition and scope of a non-international 
anned conflict has unquestionably triggered the recent advocacy of the existence of 
a new fonn of conflict now said to be in play-that is, "transnational armed conflict." 
This term has been used in different ways. One commentator makes use of it to 
describe a hybrid form of conflict, neither international nor non-international in 
character, but hostilities that fall somewhere in between and which represent the 
extraterritorial application of military combat power by the regular armed forces of 
51 
Defining Non-International A rmed Conflict: A Historically Difficult Task 
a State against a transnational non-State entity.24 Others have identified such con-
flicts as those that occur between a State and a non-State group (or between non-
State groups) on the territory of more than one State, and would characterize these 
as "armed conflicts of a non-international character." In their view, the geograph-
ical element should not serve as the determinative factor in assessing whether a 
conflict is international in nature. "Internal conflicts are distinguished from inter-
national armed conflicts by the parties involved rather than by the territorial scope 
of the conflict. "25 The most cited examples of what these commentators would ad-
judge to be "transnational armed conflicts" would appear to be the Israel Defense 
Forces' incursions into southern Lebanon in 2006 and into Gaza in 2009. While I 
remain unconvinced of either the existence or the need for creation of this new 
form of anned conflict, the discussion of such is certain to continue. 
So where does this leave us in terms of being able to reasonably identify violence 
that has risen to the level of a non-international armed conflict? In brief, see Com-
mon Article 3, Article 1( 4) of Proto col I (which transforms certain NIACs into in-
ternational armed conflicts), Article 1(1) of Protocol II, and, at least potentially, 
depending on fu ture State practice, the determinative criteria articulated in the 
T adii decision. 
Identifying Non-International Anned Conflicts: U.S. State Practice 
Now to my second assigned mission at the conference: U.S. State practice with re-
spect to the manner in which it determines the existence--or non-existence--of a 
non-international anned conflict. Here, I am tempted to simply bring this article 
to a close with the concluding remark "there is none." And while such a premature 
conclusion is perhaps untenable, I, nevertheless, believe the statement to be an ac-
curate one. 
Given the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan, a product of the Bush admin-
istration's bastardization of the law of anned conflict, the United States may now 
feel compelled to at least give lip service to the possibility of affording a slightly 
broader view of the phrase "conflicts not of an international character.» However, I 
would see the government, having given a nod in this direction, then hastening to 
note that as the international community has been unable to achieve consensus on 
an agreed definition of non-international armed conflict, and given that a transi-
tion from international to non-international armed conflict is often quite subtle in 
nature,26 a decision as to whether any form of violence has--or has not---evolved 
into a non-international armed conflict is, ultimately, the responsibility of the gov-
ernment faced with the armed threat in issue. 
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Having taken this position, the United States may well take the view that, in 
those cases in which it engages in foreign internal defense operations (the provi-
sion of U.S. advice and/or assistance to a foreign government faced with an internal 
threat from a non-State actor), while the decision as to whether this threat does-
or does not---constitute a non-international armed conflict might be made jointly 
by the United States and the host government, the United States would ordinarily 
defer to the latter's judgment on this matterY 
The bottom line is that past practice indicates that the U.S. approach toward 
the issue of determining whether certain combatant activity is or is not a non-
international armed conflict is completely self-serving, as it is for every State. 
From a purely bureaucratic standpoint, a determination as to whether U.S. mili-
tary operations taken against an armed non-State actor should be characterized as 
a non- international armed conflict might be cited as a matter for U.S. interagency 
coordination. In reality, however, U.S. practice again reflects the fact that in most, 
if not all, cases, no "official" U.S. government determination is ever made. This 
was certainly the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan as these conflicts transitioned 
from international to non- international conflict. Instead, the United States has 
historically sought to protect its personnel involved in military operations that 
fall short of international armed conflict--or that might arguably be character-
ized as non-international armed conflict-and has sought compliance with the 
basic provisions of the law of armed conflict by its adversaries in such situations 
by formally stating that, as a matter of policy rather than law: "Members of the 
DoD Components comply with the Law of War during all armed conflicts, how-
ever such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations." 211 
I see no reason to expect a change in this U.S. approach toward dealing with the 
matter ofNIAC characterization in the future. The U.S. government will continue 
to make no "official" determinations regarding whether certain hostili ties do or do 
not constitute non-international armed conflicts. Again, while completely self-
serving, it is an approach grounded in practicality and one that has produced a rea-
sonably successful track record thus far. 
N otes 
1. Hersch Laulerpachl, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BruTISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 360, 381-82 (1952). 
2. For a discussion of the concept of "transnational" armed conflicts. see Andreas Paulus & 
Mindia Vashalunadze, Asymmetric War and the NOtiOTJ of Armed ConJ1ict-A Tentative Conctp-
twllizatiOTJ, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW Of THE RED CROSS 95, 110-12 (2009). 
3. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12. 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the 
53 
Defining Non-International Armed Conflict: A Historically Difficult Task 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded> Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.s.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
4. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (Jean S. Pictet 00., 
1952) [hereinafter PICTET COMMENTARY]. 
5. Id. at 32. 
6. For a diS'-ussion of the «internationalization" of a non-international armed conflict, see 
MICHAEL N. SCHMIIT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE 
LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 2 (2006); Legalityof the 
Threat or Use ofNudear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.e.j. 226, 79 & 82 (July 8); Mili· 
tary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S. ), 1986 I.e.j. 14,1 115 
(June 27). 
7. JEAN S. PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAl HUMANITARIAN 
LAw 47 (1985) . 
8. For a discussion of State denial of the existence of a non-international armed conflict 
wi th in its borders, see Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting tile Scope of Internal Armed 
Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, 183 MILITARY LAw REVIEW 66, 83-88 (2005). 
9. PICTETCOMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 49-50. 
10. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of I 2 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic· 
tims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.5. 609. 
II. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 108-13 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno 
Zimmennann 00s., 1987). 
12. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT ·94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for In terlocutory 
Appeal on jurisdiction (Int'I Crim. Trib. for the Fonner Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
13. Id., 170. 
14. Prosecutor v. Tadit, Case No. IT -94-1-T, Judgment, 562 (Int' I Crim. Trib. for the For· 
mer Yugoslavia May 7,1997). 
15. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4·T, judgment, 1 620 (Sept. 2, 1998) . 
16. Rome Statute of the In ternational Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
17. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Inter· 
national Criminal Court, June IS-July 17, 1998, 35th Meeting of the Committee Whole, 1 8, 
U.N. Doc. AlCONF.183/C.lISR.35, available at http://untreaty.un.orglcoddiplomaticconferencesl 
icc-1998/docs/engiish/voI2/a_conCI83_c l_sr35.pdf. 
18. For a detailed discussion of the Bush administration's misapplication of the law of anne<! 
conflict to the issue of detainees held by the U.S. government post-9fII, see David E. Graham, The 
Dual U.S. Standard for tile Treatmen t and Interrogation of Detainees: Unlawful and Unworkable, 
48 WASHBURN LAw JOURNAL 325 (2009). 
19. Hamdan v. Rwnsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
20. 1d. at 630-31. 
21. PICTETCOMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 50 (emphasis added) . 
22. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 18 
(2003), available at http://www.comw.orglqdrlfui ltextl0302nsct.pdf. 
23. Paulus &Vashakmadze, supra note 2, at 99. 
54 
David E. Graham 
24. Geoffrey S. Corn, HamtUln, LebanOTJ, and tile Regulation of Armed Omflict: The Need to 
Recogniu a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW 295 (2007). 
25. Paulus &Vashakmadze, supra note 2, at 112. 
26. Opera tion Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom are classic 
examples of the subtle nature of such transitions. 
27. It can be argued, however, that, in the manerof making a decision as to whether the on· 
going conflict in Afghanistan has, over time, transitioned into a non-international armed con· 
fl ict, the Uni ted States has neither deferred to nor aCied jointly with the Afghan government in 
making such a decision. 
28. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program 4.1 
(2006), available at http://www.dtic.miVwhsJdirectives/corres/pdfI2311 0 1 e.pdf. 
55 
